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THE SEARCH FOR STOCK MARKET BUBBLES:
AN EXAMINATION OF THE NYSE INDEX
Andrew J. Economopolous and Avinash G. Shetty
Ursinus College

ABSTRACT
Many have put forth reasons why the stock market has climbed to new and
unprecedented heights. Two reason are examine: (1) investors are expecting prices to increase and
are bidding up price irrationally; (2) investors have moved to a long-term strategy and are
requiring a lower risk premium. For the latter reason, the rise in stock prices is due to a change in
the fundamentals, and for the former reason the rise represents the classical bubble. The evidence
indicates that risk preferences have changed while price momentum does not appear during bubble
period.

INTRODUCTION
Economic theory is based on the presupposition that humans are rational beings, out to
maximize their utility. Yet, the recent volatility in stock prices has called into question the
rationale of the investor, and has rekindled the longstanding debate on stock market bubbleswhether they are fact or fiction. In December 1996, Federal Reserve chairman, Alan Greenspan,
warned that the market was being driven by "irrational exuberance." Some have explained this
characterization of the stock market as excessive speculation or a mania while others have argued
that what is often perceived as a bubble is in fact just the stock market reflecting a new or
changing fundamental, and not really the symptoms of a market gone astray with speculative
exuberance. This debate was most recently observed in two of the March 2001 WSJ issues where
Robert J Shiller asked "Is the bubble fully burst or is it still on the way down?" while James K
Glassman argued that a Dow of 36000 is still a "good bet" and nothing has changed. i
This paper will examine these two arguments and see if the movement of stock prices
over the last 34 years has shown any evidences of "bubble" or "shifts" in the fundamentals. In the
next section the fundamental of stock price evaluation model is given. The Gordon discounted
cash flow model will provide the framework for key factors that motivate investors in the market.
In section three we will examine the two arguments for the recent movements in stock price. In
section four, the evidence is presented. It appears that there has been a significant shift in
1I1vestor's attitudes towards risk and that this shift may have contributed to the movement in stock
pnces.

THE FUNDAMENTALIST APPROACH TO STOCK PRICE VALUATION
The price of a share of stock can be calculated using the discounted present value of all
future expected dividends . Under the simple assumption that dividends grow at a constant rate,
Gordon (1959) has shown that the price of a share of stock is:
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p =
I

D '+I ,

(1 )
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where PI i the pri e of the to k, DI+ 11th exp cted di idend on th share m the next pen od, k
i th~ required return b th average inve tor on the hare of tock, and g IS the expected growth of
dividend (assumed to be les than the expected retumt. Equation (1) tates that the investors will
asse s a fIrm' expected di idend payout, the future potential growth of dividend , and will adjust
pnce ac ording to their required return.
For a given portfolio of to k , equation (I) would be modified uch that the pnce of the
portfolio of tock would equal the expected dividends generated by the portfolio, the reqUlred
return on the portfolio and the expected growth of the portfolio. If the portfolio represents a
market ba ket of tock , the required r turn would qual the "market" reqUIred return (km ). The
market return i de ompo ed into the n k-free tnt re t rate (krf) and the market nsk premIUm
(2)

For a mgle har of tock there are two type of nsk facm g th In e tor: firm spec ific (or
company unique) n k, and mark t r lated n k. Finn pe di c n k can be elIminated by ha vmg a
\\ell-dl\'er ified portfolio and I hence often r ferr d to a dl\.' r lfiable fI k Mark t rISk,
howev r, can never be elimmated and would be th mInimum n k expo ur fa mg the mve tor.
Thu , the market n k premIUm I th "pn e" IIlve tor' de Ire given the current market n sk
The effiCIent market theory argue that financIal a ts are ah ays priced correctly,
gl en what is publl ly kno\\n at all tlmes.iil
ummg that all pia er m the market buy their stock
anned with identical informatIon, no mdl\ Idual mv tor hould be abl to b at the market before
the market readjust It elf to PrJ e d tennlned by the mark t fundam ntal For a give n portfolio,
the portfoho pnce would be deterrruned by

p

=
pi

D"'+I

(krf +R1D11/ ) -gIll

,

(3)

s per the above equation, ceterIS panbus, any m rea e In the n k-free rate (k rf )or ri k
premIum (RPm) should result In a corresponding decreas in PPI \ htle any tncrea e In the expected
diVidends of the portfoho (Dpl If )or the gro th of the dl Idends (gill ) hould cau e a
correspondmg Increase In PPI' hocks to the macroeconomIc economy are the primary cau e In
the movements of the portfolio ariables, and would Impact the price of th market portfolto.

"EX PL

I

10

FOR TH

RE

MO

J

T

K PRJ

The hlstoncal rise in stock pnces 0 er the la t 5 year ha re I cd the debate on whether
the Increase is a speculati e bubble or due to a shift In fundamentals . T 0 of the more popular
major proponents of the irratIOnal exuberance position ar Ktndleberger (1996) and. chtller
(2000). Both researchers assert that investors wtll be prone to the p ychological element \: Ithm
the market. ThiS theme IS not new and was first argued by Hyman Min ky (1982). Min ky'. as
the first to set up the frame ork for the theory of bubbles in which the boom bust cycles In the
stock market are the result of speculatl e investing"'.
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The Bubble Explanation
Min ky identified five pha es of a speculatIve bubble or as he describes it - mania: the
shock, speculation, euphoria, the lull, and the panic.

The Shock '
The mania begins with a shock to the macroeconomic system. This shock could be
anythlOg: a bumper harve t, the outbreak of war, widespread use of a new invention, surprising
finanCIal success etc. The shock bnngs about an increase in profit opportunities in at least one
important sector of the economy. BUSlOesses and individuals rush to take advantage of this new
profit opportunity and increase their demands on the financial system.

Speculative Finance:
The role of financial intermedIaries in financing of the speculation is a very important
one. Lenders of hort-term credit would have a tendency to reinforce the speculation by financing
other inve tment opportunitIes.v Fmancialleverage by fmancial intermediaries and firms
continues to grow as long as participants view the inherent risk in the market as low. Overall, in
the market, everyone - both sound investors and speculators - appear keen to participate in the
optimism.

Euphoria'
The over optirrustic forecasts of dividends and the growth in dividends causes both the
demand for goods and fmancial assets to rise. This leads to a further increase in profit opportunity
attracting even more firms and investors. The positive feedback of increased income from new
investments creates an upward spiral of demand for stocks and stock prices in the market. This
stage is what Minsky ca lls "euphoria".
The more popular notion of euphoria phase is describe by Malkiel:
"Greed run amok has been an essential feature of every spectacular boom in history. In
their frenzy for money, market participants throw over firm foundations of value for the
dubious but thrilling assumption that they too can make a killing by building castles in
the air" (Malkiel 35).
Others, such as Flood and Shiller, have tried to explain euphoria in more rational terms vi . Flood
states,
"A bubble can arise when the actual market price depends positively on its own expected
rate of change, as normally occurs in asset markets. Since agents forming rational
expectations do not make systematic prediction errors, the positive relationship between
price and its expected rate of change implies a similar relationship between price and its
actual rate of change. In such conditions, the arbitrary, self-fulfilling expectation of price
changes may drive actual price changes independently of market fundamentals ... " (Flood
1994, 1)
Although Shiller believes that the increase in market valuations can be caused by changes
in fundamentals vii, he argues that during some periods "individual stock price changes may tend to
be anchored to the price change of other stocks ... This kind of anchoring may help explain why
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individual stock prices move together a much as they do, and thus ultimately why stock price
inde 'es are a olatile as they are ." ( hiller 2000, 138)

The lull before the storm ·
peculation continues a mdividual buy securities for resale rather than for their stream
of income. They enter th market to purcha e hares at "inflated" values . In anticipation of greater
gains, se eral individuals convert their avings from one form of investment to another. At this
point tock price are driven more by mdividual trying to predict the mentality of the crowd,
rather than by their fundamental . However, neither a boom nor uch euphoria lasts forever.

Pallie:
ome speculators realizmg that the market can't go any higher start selling their stock.
Some indi iduals choose to sell out and lea e the market while other fmd themsel es m a state of
financial distres . If such a bust encourage "long-term in estors" to ell, then It might suggest
that the market may have been dri en by speculation. If investor psychology and behaVIOr were
actually driven by Idealistic concepts and fads that change periodically It \\ ould be hard to stand
by the efficient markets hypothesis.

Shifting Fundamentals:
James K . Glassman (1999) and others ha e argued that th mcrease In pnc s IS due to a
hift m the underlying fundamentals.'iii He ha pointed out that e are e penencmg an
mformation re olution . 0 er the years, there ha e been drastic changes m the way both
mdividuals and companies do business, and m the type of mdlvldual partlclpatmg m the stock
market. The entue orld is emergmg into a global economy. It .. ould eem natural then that the
stock market would reflect this massi e transformatIOn that e as a CI 11Ization are gomg through
As fmns seem to become more and more share holder onented, simultaneously, with the
expansIOn of stock 0\ nershlp, the in estor has evolved mto a far more informed and educated
player in the market for financial assets . Once again, technology and personal computers playa
ery Important role in thiS e olution. PC's ha e become a ery Important tool to the mdivldual
investor, both as a source of Information through the Internet, and as a ehlcle of transaction. The
Great Depression generatIOn is dymg out. The players in the market today are not as scared of the
market. Investors ha e a better understanding of the stock market than pre lOusly, thanks mamly
to more consumer friendly brokerage fums , banks, discount brokers, Journahst , scho lars and e en
the mass media .ix

Relevant Risk
Glassman also notes that the relevant fisk of long-term mvesting in the stock market has
dropped significantly, and IS still continUing to declme :~ In the short run, however, the
in estment IS still fully susceptible to the short-term volatility of the stock market, giving no
guarantee of positive returns to the short-term mvestor. The risk premium for the long-term
investor, however, IS lower than that for the short-term investor. This would indicate that the
reqUIred return for the long-term investor is lower and hence , the real value of a share of stock to
the long-term investor would be higher than what the short-term investor would evaluate its (the
stock's) pnce to be.
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The duration for which a player intends to maintain his investment in the market is based
on several demographic and perhaps even institutional factors. There are various groups of
investors in the market resulting in several different "fundamental values." As the baby boomer
generation starts to plan for retirement, and as the government provides incentives to invest for the
long-term through retirement programs such as IRA's, a larger p<?rtion of the investor population
will have a greater incentive to invest in stocks for the 10ng-run. xl As the risk premium for stocks
falls, long-term traders begin to purchase more and more stock from short run investors, thus
pushing up prices. Given that a large proportion of the earning population, (the baby boomer
generation,) is fast heading towards retirement, it does seem reasonable to assume that they would
have a preference towards purchasing long-term stocks at seemingly inflated values.
Thus, the recent publicity by Glassman, and others notably Siegel (1998), have persuaded
investors that holding a stock portfolio for long periods of time was the best investment
alternative:
"the longer you hold on to stocks, the less volatile your returns and the more likely
you will make money. Stocks have appeared to obey a kind of reversion to the mean whatever goes down, must go up. Assume you hold a diversified portfolio of stocks such as S&P 500 - for ten years instead of one year. Risk shrinks significantly. For the
sixty-four overlapping ten-year periods between 1926 and 1998, (1926-1935, 1927-1936,
etc.), the S&P stocks scored positive returns sixty-one times. For the fifty-eight versions
of fifteen years, they were positive every year. In fact, over the worst twenty-year period
from 1929 to 1948, the total gain was 84 percent" (Glassman 27).
This gradual promotion of receiving high returns with lower risk for long-term investors
along with the influx of long-term investors lends support to the argument that the market risk
.
premium of investors may have declined over time.

EMPIRICAL SECTION:
As established in the theory section, the price of a share of stock is calculated as the time
adjusted present value of the sum of its anticipated future earnings. Certain market
"fundamentals" determine the expected earnings of a fmancial asset. Any deviation of actual
stock prices from the price determined by the fundamentals is said to be as a result of speculation.
These prices, however, should correct themselves, in time, conforming to the prices determined by
the fundamentals. A sustained deviation of stock prices from the fundamental price is what we
refer to as a speculative bubble. However, it is conceivable, that what is perceived as a speculative
bubble, may in fact be nothing more than the stock market reflecting a new or changing
fundamental, and not the symptoms of a market unstable due to speculative excess. Understanding
and individually analyzing the fundamentals might help us better understand the issue of
speculative bubbles in the stock market. The empirical model developed in this paper uses the
fundamental relationship and examines the theories related to stock price momentum, and risk
premium on stock prices.
.
The basic model tested
Portfolios Price = f ( k rf , RPm, Dp1 + 1/ , gm)
(-) (-)
(+)
(+)

(4)
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indicate that the portfolio price I negatively related to the risk free rate of return in the market
and market ri k premium, and is po itively related to expected dividends and expected growth in
di idend .
Data and Modificatioll

The period under examinatlOn extend from January 1966 to July 2000.xlI The NYSE
index v as u ed to repres nt the market portfolio. Since this study exall1lnes the phenomenon of
speculati e bubble in the entire tock market, a opposed to an mdivldual firm or mdustry, the
E composite inde
a u ed m order to capture tock pnce movements acro the board. The
monthly a erage of the mdex wa calculated from end-of-day prices.
Corporate dl Idend oUected by the . . Department of ornmerce was used as a proxy
for diVIdend of the Y E portfolio. The Y E represent over 70% of the total market value of
publicly traded firms in the economy; thu we would expect that the dIvidends of the economy
should approximate the movement m dl Idends of the Y E portfolIo. Smc the Department of
Commerce's series I reported on a quarterly baSIS, monthly e timate were made based on the
quarterly reports and ince the e monthly estimates are calculated from the actual reports, they
would al 0 approximate the expected mo\ ement In dl Idend .
Two anables were used for the nsk free Intere t rate : the yield of a ten-year Treasury
Bond and the YIeld on the three-month Treasury BIll. mpm al tudles have mployed both
short-term and long-term rate a the n k fre rat. 11 1 hort-term securIty rate are u ed because
they reflect the nsk-free Itquldlty chOice of Ime tors . Long-term ecunty rate are used because
long-term ecuritie are a closer mat h to the matunty profile of tocks .
SInce the ex-ante market rIsk prell1lum cannot be directly obser ed, two pro y variables
v.·ere created in an attempt to capture any changes In the market n k of the stock market that ll1lght
ha e occurred 0 er the years. Ex-ante nsk pr mlUm on bond can be calculated from thell yield .
The first proxy IS a tradltlOnal measure of relatl e fISk (BBB lOYR TB); henceforth called relative
risk. It as calculated by dIVidIng the leld of BAA by the YIeld of the ten-year n k-free Treasury
Bond. As the mea ure Increases, we ould expect that the nsk premium on tocks to increase by
the same amount. The econd proxy IS a measure of the relatJ e nsk betw en the dIfferent classes
of risk (RlSKlND); henceforth called the risk Index. If m estors are takIng a long-term view of
in estmg, as Glassman suggests, then the tradltlOnal measure of relatl e nsk may not capture the
shift In the premIUm between bonds and stocks. An Index of the relatIve nsk was created by
takmg the ratio of the YIelds of a BAA bond and an AAA bond and dividIng it by the ratIO of AAA
and a lO-year nsk-free Treasury bond. XIV ThIS nsk Index sho s the relative ri k premia within the
market among secuntles. An mdex equal to one suggests that the market has gi en relatively
equal weIght to the nsk premIum of the hIgher nsk securIty relatl e to the lower n k security. As
the mdex moves above one, In estors are requmng a higher fisk premmm on the higher risk
secuntles relati e to the lower nsk securitIes - this movement has been called the "flight to
quality". As the market moves below one, m estors are requlflng a relatl ely smaller risk
premium on the high-nsk secunty. In thIS case in estors are sellmg off low-nsk (high quality)
seCUrItIes and purchastng hIgh-risk (low quality) secunties. We argue that an increase in the risk
mdex Implies that the market fisk premIum on stocks IS mcrea tng relatl e to the high-risk
securIty.

the

FInally, a proxy was used for expected growth m diVIdends: the difference in the log of
YSE tndex lagged one penod
nder the constant growth model, the growth in expected
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dividends is equivalent to the expected capital gain yield of the stock. Thus, the proxy would
measure the total capital yield one-month prior to the current index.

Glassman's Assertion of Smaller Risk Premiums Driving Higher Stock Price
Before testing the stock-pricing model directly, we need to assess Glassman's assertion
that there was a shift in risk preference of the investor. If risk in the stock market has been
declining over time, as Glassman suggests, we should observe this directly by the movement of
the relative risk between high-risk and low-risk securities. We would expect both the traditional
measure of risk and the index to shrink. The relative risk measurement is given in Figure 1. Over
the last 34 years the risk premium has moved within a narrow range and does not show any
decreasing trend. Since 1981 when IRA's were allowed as a tax-free vehicle for long-term
savings, the average risk premium increased slightly. Towards the end of the century, it appears
that the premium was moving slightly above the norm.
When the risk index is graphed for the same period (Figure 2), the findings were more
consistent with Glassman's observations. There has clearly been a drop in the risk premium
offered on high-risk bonds relative to low-risk bonds. This trend seems to start in 1985 and
continued to decline throughout the 1990's. If this trend were extended to the premium between
stocks and BBB bonds, the Glassman argument would appear to have some merit.
These movements, however, may not be solely due to the change in the investor's longterm time horizon, but due to the changes in the general economy. In a strong economy short-term
investors would be willing to accept a smaller risk premium as weW v . To test to see if the default
premium was caused by the changes in the general economy, the proxies were regressed against
the log of monthly industrial production, log of M2, and the log of the ratio of the 10-year and
one-year Treasury securities, a set of dummy variables, and an interaction variable to assess the
Glassman theory:
Log of Default Prem t =

ao +atLIPt +a2LM2t + a3LEXPt + a4D82-86t +a sD87-92 t
+a6D93-97t +a7D98-00t +agDLIP t +

Ut.

It is expected that the default premium will move inversely with real economic activity
denoted by the log of industrial production (LIP), and positively with the liquidity (LM2) denoted
by the log of M2. xvi As noted by Cook and Hendershott (1978) if there is an increase in interest
rate expectations (LEXP) by the same amount for long-term securities, the spread may not change,
but relative risk would decline. For our risk index, since the index is a ratio of relative risks, we
would expect little change in the index when interest rate expectations change by the same
amount. The proxy for interest rate expectations is the spread between the 10-year and one-year
treasury securities. Dxyears are dummy variables taking on the value of one for the period of time
indicated. Since Glassman argued that it was the long-term investor that was moving the market
risk premium lower, we started with 1982 when the Treasury issued rules to allow IRA's to be
more accessible to the publicxvii . Five-year periods were used to show the publics' adjustment to
investing in the stock market. We would expect the dummy variables to have negative
coefficients. Finally, DLIP is an interaction variable where industrial production (LIP) is
multiplied times a dummy variable taking on the value of one during the 1982 to 2000 period. A
positive coefficient on the interaction variable would suggest that investors are less sensitive to
percentage changes in industrial production since 1982. A negative coefficient would suggest
investors are more sensitive to percentage changes in industrial production.
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The re ults of the relative risk mea urement regre sion (given below with standard errors)
confirm mo t of the expected hypothe e except for the dummy variables over the I8-year period.
BBB 10YR, = -.067 -.2640 LIP, + .09 3 LM21 1 - .0017 LExp'_1+ .0018 082-86, + .0183087-921
(.024) (.102)*
(.039)**
(.0006)*
(.020)
(.020)
+ .062 093-97, + .1461 09 -00, - .0043 OLIP,
(.027)**
(.003)* (.006)
OW: 1.54

AR(2)

oeffelclents: -.918
(.049)

+.096
(.049)

After accounting for mo em nt m mdu tnal productIOn, liqUidity and lllterest expectatIOns,
relatIve nsk mcrea ed ben: een 1993 and 2000. This e\ ldence suggests that stock premIUm would
have also mcreased during the later part of the 1990' and the tock market could not have been
linked to the shift in the nsk premIUm.
To as e whether there \,; a a change m the relatl e n k among vanous risk classes, the
Risk Inde ' .. as u ed as a dependent anable. The result, gl en below, sugg st that there were
slglllficant changes among the nsk cla es dunng the 1990's.
RI KINO,= -.1743-.153 LIP,+.0750LM2 1_1 + .0012L xP,_I + .0019082-86,-.02270 7-92,
(.194) (.084)*** (.032)**
(0005)**
(,017)
(.017)
- .0655 093-97, - .1019 098-00, - .012 OUP I
(.022)*
(.029)*
(.005)**
OW: 1.44

R( 1)

oeffelclent : -.83
( 027)

There was sltght declme ben: een 1987 and 1992, but this shift IS not statl t!cally slglllficant.
Relati e risk did show a sharp and slglllficant decltne after 1992. The index between 1993 and
1997 decltned on a erage by .065 hJle It declmed on average by . 10 between 1998 and 2000.
The dumm1es clearly show that m estor's preference to ards the hlgh-nsk cia ses dropped
relati e to the 10 nsk class even v hen v.:e account for economic act! Ity.
nhke the first model, the mteractlOn vanable was statistically sigmficant. The negative
coefficient on the mteractlOn anable suggests that in estors showed a shght increase in
sensiti ity to changes m economic actlVlty. This higher ensltivlty could be a result of the shift in
preference of the m estor to a long-term honzon. With fewer short-term traders, changes in
economic activity result m Wider swmg m premlUms whtle long-term m e tor Sit on the
sidelines even when nsk premIUms look favorable.
Thus, the recent movements m the stock market could have been caused, as Glassman
argued, by the shiftmg of the nsk premium reqUired by mvestors among the different risk cla ses
of secuntles.
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Minsky's Model
To test Minsky 's theory concerning stock price momentum, the identification of "bubble
periods" was needed. We defined an (ex post) "positive bubble period" when the stock index had
a positive return for at least a year followed by a drop in the index by at least 10% for the next two
months. The 10% drop over a two-month period was a rare event - the average two-month change
in the index was 1.5% with a standard deviation of 5.6% . This suggests that prior to the drop the
market may have "overvalued" stocks. The twelve-month period prior to the drop should have
been enough time to capture the euphoria effect that Minsky asserted. We also include "negative
bubbles" in which price momentum moved in the opposite direction. xviii Ex post negative bubbles
were defined when the index rose by at least 9% over a two month period after the index had
declined over the last year. These period were when the market "undervalued" stocks. A
summary of the periods are given in Table 1.
To detennine if there was price momentum during these periods, an interaction variable
was created. This variable is constructed by multiplying a dummy variable times the proxy
variable for expected growth in dividends. If investors were influenced by price momentum, then
the coefficient on the interaction variable would be positive. This would indicate that an increase
(decrease) in the capital yield would have a larger impact on stock prices due to investor euphoria
( depression).
In order to capture both the short-run and long run dynamics of stock price adjustments
an error correction model (ECM) was used . xix An ECM follows a two-step procedure. The first
step is to estimate the long-run equilibrium stock price model (equation 4) using log levels of the
variables:
LSPPort t = Uo + ulLDIV t - U2LRFt - u 3LDefPremt + U4 LSPricet_1 + Et
(5)
Where:
•
LSPPort t is the log of monthly average NYSE Index,
•
LDIV t is the log of monthly corporate dividends,
•
LRF t is the log of the monthly risk-free rate 3-M T-Bill or 10-Yr T-Bond,
•
LDefPremtis the log of BBBIlOYr (relative riskr x ,
•
LSPricet_1 is the difference in the log of the monthly index lagged one period
The second step is to take the error series from equation 5, lagged one period, and to include it in
the final regression using the first difference of the log of each variable. When the error is
positive, it implies that the actual price index exceeds the estimated long-run equilibrium price.
Consequently, we would expect the market price to drop in the next period as it adjusts to the
long-run equilibrium value. Thus, the coefficient on the lagged error tenn should be negative.
Two ECM were estimated: the basic model and the price momentum model for each of
the risk-free securities:

where, MorrillLSP t_1is an interaction variable designed to capture the "Minsky bubble" effect of
past changes in stock prices on the current change in stock price. The results, given in Table 2,
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indicate that the Gordon constant growth theory i supported in the basIc models (Models 1 and
3). The Dickey-Fuller t-stati tic from the augmented Dickey-Fuller regression indicate that the
error are uncorrelated and the relationship i cointegrated in both models.
In Model 1, a expected, expected dividend had a positive impact on the NYSE Index.
A one percent change in the growth of expected dividends resulted in a .467 percent increase in
the gro th of stock price . The coefficient for the 1O-year T-Bond was - 0.549, indicating that the
change in the ri k free rate of one percent would cause a negative change m the monthly NY E
composite inde 'b .549 percent, ceteri paribus. The change in relative risk in the market had a
similar impact on the monthly Y E index; a change in the relative risk in the market of one
percent \ ould cause an opposite change in the Y E index by .512. Theory sugge ts that there IS
unit elasticity ben: een stock prices and the market retum, which is close to the summation of the
nsk-free and default premium coefficients found in Model 1. When there was an increase in the
appreciation of the Y E Inde by 1% - indicating a change in the expected growth In the YSE
- the Y E increased by .22.

It also appears that the change in the Y E index are impacted by deviations m the
long-run relationship. When the actual mdex exceeded the expected index, suggesting an overevaluation, there as a decrease in the mark t the followmg month by .037 percent. LikeWise,
when the actual mdex as les than the expected inde there wa an increase m the market the
follo\ ing month.
In Model 3 111 which we examme the ba IC mod I usmg the three-month T-Bdl , our
general results stilI hold, but the SIze and the significance of the coefficient dIffer on some of the
ariable . The coefficients on expected dividends expected growth m the Y , and errorcorrection term \: ere siffillar in size and significance to coefficient m Modell . The coefficient
on the risk free and default premium had the correct Igns, but they were mailer than tho e
estimated in Modell and the coeffiCient on the default premIUm wa m Igmficant.
In the price momentum regressIOns (Models 2 & 4), \: hlch exammes Mm ky's theory, the
coeffiCients had the correct sign, but ere tatl tLcally mSlgmficant. ThiS ugge ts that dunng the
penods where prices ere appreCiating, the identifiable (ex-post) "bubble penods", mvestors dld
not increase their in estment due to the price appreciation. onsequently .. e could not find the
Minsky effect.

CO
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Two key areas of the debate over what has cau ed the recent tock market movement
ha e been revle ed: shift in risk preference or pflce momentum. DUring the la t decade It appears
that there was a shift in the risk preference of m estors. While the relative differential between
high-risk securities and low-risk securities mcreased during the last decade, the relative fisk
between classes of securities declined. In other words, investors were reqUITing a smaller risk
premIUm on high-fisk securities for a given risk premIUm on lOW-fisk securities. This could ha e
been due to the mcreased invol ement of long-term inve torS who were willmg to reqUire a
smaller premium on stocks.
The eVidence did not support the contention that the recent bull market was due to herd
mentality where the movement 111 prIces led investors to mve t more thereby dn mg up pnce. The
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"bubble periods" did not show any additional and significant impact on prices prior to a significant
fall.
These results have two key policy implications. First, for those who believe in "bubbles"
and have argued that the Fed should help deflate the over-evaluated market, their policy
recommendation is misguided. It appears that the market does price stocks based on the
fundamentals. Second, even if the Fed were to intervene, it appears that monetary policy has a
small impact on stock prices. The short-tenn risk-free rate, a key tool of the Fed, does not
influence the market as much as the longer-term risk-free market. The effect of short-term interest
rates is over six times smaller than long-term rates. This suggests that the Fed should focus on
long-tenn inflation expectations, which drives long-term rates, rather than the current movement
in stock prices.
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Table 1
Bubble Breaks
Drop in NYSE Index
Two Month Change

Two Month Period

-10.2%
-11.6%
-24 .5%
-12 .2%

Jul Aug 1970
Dec 1974, Jan 1975

+ 19.0%

Tv

Change in NYSE Index
Prev Year Prev 6 mths
14.0%
17.6%
34.4%
1.9%
21.7%

-21.1 %
-31.0%

13.1%
6.7%
10.7%
7.7%
10.2%

-15.6%
-18 .1%

1.5%
5.6%

0 Month A erage Return
Two Month Standard De iation

Tabl 2
tock E aluatlon E. .M . Model
Independent Variable

Modell
BASIC

Lagged Error

-.037
(.011)*
.467
(.156)*
-.549
(.077)*

LDIVIDENDS
LIOYrT-BO D

Model 2
PRICE
MOMENTUM
-.037
(.011)*
.467
(.157)*
-.548
(.078)*

L3-M T-BILL
RELRISK
LA Gi1STKIND EX

-.512
(.120)*
.222
(.046)*

LMOMENTUM
F-Stat
Dickey Fuller t-stat
( ) Standard Error

26.09
-10.32

-.511
(.120)*
.221
(.052)*
.007
(.102 )
21.7
-10.32

Model 3
BA I
-.027
(.008)*
.479
(.164)*

-.087
(.029)*
.087
(.078)
.279
(.047)*

16.28
- 10.50

*, **, *** SIgnIficant at the 99%,95%, and 90% levels
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Model 4
PRJ
MOME TUM
-.028
(.008)*
.479
(.165)*

-.090
(.029)*
.087
(.078)
.27 1
(.054)*
.036
(.108)
13 .56
-10.48
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ENDNOTES
Robert J hiller, "The Fed Can't Prop Up the Falling Markets" , WSJ, March 15 , 2001 , p. A18 .
James K. Glassman, Dow 36000? It's till a Good Bet", W J, March 20, 2001 , p. A22 .
It Gi en an equilibrium price, the expected return to the illvestor can be determmed from equation
(1) . Rearranging equation (1) Yield the expected return is equal to the dividend yield plus g
where g would be the expected capital gain yield.
iiI Malkiel Burton ( 1999) ha populanzed thi fundamental theory.
i\ Kindleberger (1996) pp. 11-15.
\ Laffargue (19 2) p.30.
\I John Y Campbell (1997) has defined a rational bubble as a
tock whose value 1 equal to the
discounted value of expected diVidend (Equation 3) plu a "bubble" value ba ed on a higher
expected price next period independent of diVidends . (p. 258)
\Ii See Shiller (2000) Chapter 2.
hiller al 0 notes there are time when the market could be
undervaluing tocks which he calls "negati e bubble ". (p .62)
'III
ee Carlson and Pelz (2000)
1:\ Glassman (1999) pp.l 0 1-1 02.
x Glassman (1999) p.l 02.
,\1 Poterba
enti, and Wise (1992) found that the go emment mcentlve retirement programs
resulted in ne\! sa"mgs and not a tran fer of avmg . ThiS uggest an mcrease m long-term
participants.
"(il Daily NYSE index data \: as obtained from the NY E web lte whlie all other data wa
gathered from the St. LOUIS Federal Reserve Bank.
xiii Financial economists ha e not come to consensus on the appropnate n k-free rate. As one
textbook notes:
' Theory calls for the use of a short-term rate, but If that rate IS u ed here [ill
equity e aluations] a difficult practical questIOns arIses : ho\ does one reflect the premIUm
required for expected inflatIOn 0 er long hOrIzons . . . It I probably easIer to use mtermedlate or
long-term riskless rates ... " (Pal pe, Healy Bernard, 2000, pp 1222- J 223)
xi, Cook and Hendershott (197 ) note that either the pread or ratio can be u ed to measure the
default prerruum. Ho e er, hen \: orkmg Ith the spread m empIrIcal e tlmahons, the Ie el of
interest rates must be included a an mdependent anable to account for the pread at a constant
Ie el of nsk. (p.1180)
"See Jaffee (1975), and Cook an Hendershott (197 ) on the emplflcal e Idence. The model u ed
in thiS paper follows Cook and Hendershott.
XVI Holding real economic actiVity constant, and mterest rat
expectation, an m rea e m hqUldlty
wIll push down the nsk-free rate relatl e to rIsky secuntles.
xviI We started With the year 1982 when the Treasury Department clanfied retIrement accounts that
made It easier for firms to allow their employees to participate m a 40 I (k) plan. The dummies
were m 5 year mcrements so the changes m demographics and adjustment to the new rules can be
observed.
It\ili Analyst would call thiS kmd of market as being under valued.
ec hiller (2000) p 62.
XIX The log form was used because theoretically, the vanables are nonlmear m their Ie els.
However, a Imear approximatIon can be made using the log form. Irst differences of the
variables were used after the test of stationary showed that the errors of the log levels followed a
random walk. When usmg transformmg to first-differences, the mtercept can be omitted.
RegreSSIOns usmg the rISk mdex were also tested. The mam result did not change, expect that
diVIdends were statIstically Significant and risk was insignificant. ince the adjusted R-squared
was about 40% lower that the model presented, the best model was given.
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